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tal to the benefits the three-question test conveys. If criticism is to be
leveled at the Court for its decision in Occidental, it should be
leveled not because of the decision itself, but for the long delay in
reaching it.
It is submitted that the Occidental decision, when read with
Emerson, provides a conclusive answer to the theoretical questions
arising under section 16(b). It may be expected that considerable
litigation will result from the decision, since the "possibility of
speculative abuse" standard is sufficiently vague to allow different
conclusions to be drawn from the same set of facts. In the future,
avoidance of at least a portion of section 16(b) liability will be
relatively easy for the instigator of an unsuccessful attempt at corpo-
rate takeover: he may either sell down in two steps, as in Emerson,
or else negotiate a "call" option with the survivor of the defensive
merger negotiated to block his takeover, as in Occidental. The
choice of which of these alternatives to adopt will depend upon the
defeated tender offeror's assessment of likely future market prices
and his willingness to gamble on the all-or-nothing question of the
possibility of speculative abuse. Since the costs of protracted se-
curities litigation are enormous, and since extended litigation is more
likely in situations similar to Occidental than in those similar to
Emerson, it is to be expected that many future defeated tender
offerors will elect the two-step selldown procedure of Emerson. For
defeated tender offerors, Occidental provides a high-risk alternative
when caught in an untenable position. From the perspective of
enforcement of section 16(b), Occidental provides an affirmation
that the intent of the legislation is far more important than is the
application of the mechanical test established to carry out that
intent.
JOHN K. OLSON
Federal Communications Commission—Review of Regulations Re-
lating to Provision of Data Processing Services by Communications
Common Carriers—GTE Service Corp. v. FCC.'--In 1966 the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) by
formal announcement in a Notice of Inquiry2 opened an investiga-
tion into a broad and increasingly significant area of rapid tech-
nological change in our society: the convergence of the data pro-
cessing and communications industries due to increasing needs to
transmit computer-stored data between data processing users in
different places. The Commission was concerned lest the rapid
technological changes in the communications and data processing
1 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966).
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fields cause the data processing industry to develop a dependence on
communications common carriers that might interfere with the car-
riers' primary obligation to provide efficient and economic com-
munications services to the public. Of particular concern to the FCC
was the marketability of communications common carriers' excess
computer capacity and the attraction this presented to such carriers
which already possessed transmission lines suitable for marketing.
The purpose of the Commission's investigation was to determine the
nature of the relationship between communications common carriers
and the data processing industry; what response, if any, should be
made to that relationship; and specifically, whether the Commission
ought to promulgate rules regulating that relationship. The 1966
Notice of Inquiry was followed by a Supplemental Notice of
Inquiry, 3
 a commissioned study by the Stanford Research Institute, 4
a Report and Further Notice of Inquiry, 5 a Tentative Decision by
the Commission, 6
 and on March 18, 1971, a Final Decision and
Order by the Comrnission 7 adopting, with additions, rules which
had been proposed in the Tentative Decision. 8
In its Tentative Decision the Commission stated that:
[T]he issues which raised basic concern in both the com-
munications and computer industries are those which re-
late to the nature and extent of the regulatory jurisdiction
and control which we intend to exercise over the furnishing
of data processing and communications services, or some
combination thereof, by non-carrier data processing or-
ganizations and the furnishing of data processing services
by communications common carriers. 9
In its Final Decision the Commission found "that there is a close and
intimate relationship between data processing and communications
services" and that "[w]ithout appropriate regulatory safeguards, the
provision of data processing services by common carriers could
adversely affect the statutory obligation of such carriers to provide
adequate communication services . . . and impair effective competi-
tion in the sale of data processing services.""
While the rules promulgated by the FCC' do not prohibit
3 7 F.C.C.2d 19 (1967).
4 Stanford Research Institute, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Compu-
ter and Communication Services, Feb. 1969 (2-volume report prepared for F.C.C., Contract
RC-10056, PI3 183,612-13).
5 17 F.C.C.2d 587 (1969),
28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970).
7 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971).
8 See note 11 infra for a statement of the rules promulgated by the Commission.
9 28 F.C.C.2d at 292.
'° 28 F.C.C.2d at 269.
11 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (Supp. 1972) provides in pertinent part:
. . . (b) Except as provided herein, no common carrier subject, in whole or in part, to
the Communications Act shall engage directly or indirectly in furnishing data pro-
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entry of common carriers into the data processing field, they are
based on a "maximum separation of activities which are subject to
regulation from nonregulated activities involving data processing, 1,12
and they provide in substance: (1) that common carriers with annual
revenues exceeding $1,000,000 may not engage in furnishing data
processing services except through a separate corporate entity hav-
ing separate books, officers, personnel and equipment, and that the
common carrier may not lease or sell equipment or services to the
separate corporation," and (2) that common carriers may not permit
the separate corporation to use its name or symbol and may not
purchase or lease equipment, goods or services from the separate
corporation. 14
On June 7, 1971, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stayed the effective date of the regulations pending judicial
review," and cases brought by data processing affiliates of five
cessing service to others except as expressly provided in paragraph (c) of this section.
This prohibition shall apply to all communications common carriers, including
section 2 (b)(2) carriers, where any carrier itself has annual operating revenues
exceeding $1,000,000 or any such carrier is directly or indirectly controlled by, or is
under common control with, another carrier or carriers, and the combined annual
revenues of all such carriers exceed $1,000,000.
(c) Except for Companies of the Bell System, common carriers may, subject to
other provisions of law, have a controlling or lesser interest in, or be under common
control with, a separate corporate entity that furnishes data processing service to
others provided the following conditions are met:
(1) Each such separate corporation must maintain its own books of account,
have separate officers, utilize separate operating personnel, and utilize comput-
ing equipment and facilities separate from those of the carrier for its data
processing service offerings.
(2) Each such common carrier shall file with the Commission a complete
statement of the terms and conditions of every written or oral contract, agree-
ment or other arrangement entered into between such carrier and any such
separate corporation within thirty days after the contract, agreement or other
arrangement is made.
(3) No such common carrier subject to the prohibition of paragraph (b) of
this section shall engage in the sale or promotion of data processing services on
behalf of any such separate corporation.
(4) No such common carrier, or a holding company owning or jointly
owning a common carrier and any such separate corporation, shall permit the
separate corporation to employ in its name any words or symbols contained in
the name of the carrier, nor shall such carrier or holding company permit any
such separate corporation to use the name of the carrier in the separate
corporation's promotional activities or enterprises.
(5) No such common carrier shall purchase, lease, or otherwise obtain any
data processing service or services from any such separate corporation.
(d) No common carrier subject in whole or in part to the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, shall sell, lease, or otherwise make available to any other entity
any capacity or computer system component on its computer system or systems
which that carrier uses in any way for the provision of its common carrier communi-
cations services.
12
 28 F.C.C.2d at 302.
13
 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.702(b), (c)(1), (2), (3), (d) (Supp. 1972).
14
 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.702(c)(4), (5) (Supp. 1972).
15 474 F.2d at 726 n.2.
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telephone carriers were consolidated in the present opinion. The
court HELD: (1) that the jurisdiction of the FCC over communica-
tions common carriers extends to the activities of these carriers in
the field of data processing services;' 6 and (2) that regulation of a
separate corporate data processing entity, based on fear of
monopolization of the data processing industry by communications
carriers, is beyond the authority of the FCC.' 7 The court found that
the rules contained in 47 C.F.R. §,§ 64.702(b), (c)(1), (2), (3) and (d)
(hereinafter Rules (b), (c)(1), (2), (3) and (d)), requiring the formation
of a separate corporate entity to sell or lease data processing ser-
vices, were valid. It based this finding on the following considera-
tions: that the primary responsibility of the FCC is to see that
communications carriers provide efficient and economic service to
the public; 18
 that "[t]he burgeoning data processing activities of the
common carriers pose, in the view of the Commission, a threat to
efficient public communications services at reasonable prices;" 19 and
that the Commission's rules requiring a "maximum separation" of
services are a rational means of providing regulation of communica-
tions common carriers in activities that might well conflict with the
carriers' principle duty to furnish efficient and inexpensive com-
munications services to the consumer. 2 °
The court further found, however, that 47 C.F.R.
64.702(c)(4) and (5) (hereinafter Rules (c)(4) and (5)), prohibiting
the use by the separate corporate entity of the carrier's name or
symbol and the purchase or lease by the carrier of computer services
from the separate entity, were invalid. 21 In doing so the court
expressed its belief that the real purpose behind these rules was not
to insure that the public was provided with efficient and economic
telephone service, but rather, to prevent communications common
carriers from acquiring monopolistic powers in the data processing
field. In this regard the court concluded:
Its the Commission's] concern here therefore is not for the
communications market which Congress has entrusted to
its care, but for data processing which is beyond its charge
and which the Commission itself has announced it declines
to regulate. We find the intrusion to be without authority
either in the Communications Act or in the cases constru-
ing it."
II' Id. at 731,
17 Id. at 733.
111 Id. at 730.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 732.
21 Id. at 733.
22 Id. The FCC's statement that it did not intend to regulate data processing is contained
in its Final Decision: "Since we are not proposing, at this time, to regulate date processing, as
such, a discussion of the extent of our jurisdiction with respect thereto is neither relevant nor
necessary . . ." 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 268 (1971).
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GTE Service Corp. represents the first time under the Federal
Communications Act23 that the FCC has been held to have asserted
jurisdiction over a technological development outside of its scope
of authority. The significance of the decision lies in the fact that the
court invalidated Rules (c)(4) and (5) not solely because of what the
rules required but primarily because of whom they regulated. 24 The
court thus delimited FCC authority on the basis of whom the
exercise of authority affects as well as on the basis of what authority
may be exerted.
This note will discuss and analyze the question of whether or
not the rules promulgated by the Commission were a valid and a
wise administrative response to the technological innovations pro-
viding remote access to data processing over common carrier lines
where the carriers themselves desire to provide data processing
services. The note will focus specifically on four aspects of this
general issue. First, in discussing the propriety of the administrative
response, it will explore the limits of the jurisdiction which the FCC
has, and may exercise, over the common carriers as it relates to their
provision of data processing services. Second, it will analyze the
administrative agency context from which the rules under considera-
tion arose to determine whether or not the extension of the agency's
power in this case might reflect more on the nature of the agency
itself than on the nature of the problem it faced. Third, with respect
to the FCC's indirect assertion of control over the data processing
affiliate, based mainly on antitrust considerations, it will examine
the Commission's statutory and common law jurisdiction in antitrust
matters, both generally and specifically as it relates to distinctions
between vertical and horizontal monopolies in communications. 25
Fourth, it will examine the Commission's alternative grounds 'for
regulation of the data processing entity—namely, that such regula-
tion is necessary for the proper enforcement of the policy behind the
Commission's rules.
I. BACKGROUND
From the time UNIVAC, the first commercially available gen-
eral purpose computer, was introduced for use by the Census
Bureau in 1951, the data processing industry has witnessed tre-
P' 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
2° The wording of the rule prohibits the carrier from dealing with the separate corpora-
tion, but the court recognized that this in effect prohibits the data processor from dealing with
the carrier. See 474 F.2d at 733.
25 Generally a "horizontal monopoly" occurs when a seller of a commodity has a large
enough share of the market to effectively limit competition. The monopolist may still lack
control of supply inputs to his business. A "vertically integrated monopoly," or "vertical
monopoly," occurs when a manufacturer has a horizontal monopoly over one factor used in
manufacturing his product. If companies X, V and Z all need ingredient A to make widgets
and if X has a monopoly on ingredient A, then companies I' and Z will be forced to pay more
than X does for ingredient A and may be forced out of the widget business not by competition
but by X's degree of "vertical integration."
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mendous growth in two distinct areas. 26 First, the "hardware" com-
ponents, which include the actual computers themselves, input de-
vices such as cards, tapes and discs, and output devices such as
teletypewriters, tapes and cathode ray tubes, have developed tre-
mendously high capacities. Second, the "software" components, in-
cluding programming, languages and programming services, have
spawned a large and diverse service industry which is devoted to
putting the computer to work by applying the capacity to the needs
of individual users.
In a complete data processing system three types of communica-
tions are required. Generally these are: (1) communications from the
terminal, where the use originates, to the central computer; (2)
communications between multiple terminals of one of several users;
and (3) communications from the computer to the outside
environment. 27 These communications could be completed without
the use of common carrier lines if the entire data processing system
were on one site. A number of factors, however, have tended to
increase the use of remote terminals working from central comput-
ers. One factor is the economics of hardware which dictate that the
largest capacity computers, if fully utilized, are the most economi-
cal. A second factor is the development during the mid-1960's of
third generation time-sharing computers which allow multiple users
to use the machines simultaneously. Third, there is the need of some
users for terminals in several sites, either in one particular area or
across the nation.
As the use of computers by industries expands, then, transmis-
sions between remote terminals and central computers will greatly
increase. These include transmissions from a remote terminal to a
central computer and then back again, from a remote terminal to a
computer which stores the information, from a terminal to a compu-
ter which processes information and passes it on to another termi-
nal, and from a terminal to a computer which selects a recipient
terminal. Depending on the functions performed, any of these
transmissions may be defined as either "data processing," "message-
switching" or "hybrid service." 28 An additional service for which
26 474 F.2d at 727.
27 C. Barnett, The Future of the Computer Utility 43 (1967).
26 These terms, among others, have been defined in 47 C.F.R. 64.702(a) (Supp. 1972):
(1) "Data Processing" is the use of a computer for the processing of information
as distinguished from circuit or message-switching. "Processing" involves the use of
the computer for operations which include, inter alia, the functions of storing,
retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data, according to programmed instruc-
tions.
(2) "Message-switching" is the computer-controlled transmission of messages,
between two or more points, via communications facilities, wherein the content of
the message remains unaltered.
(3) "Local Data Processing Service" is an offering of data processing wherein
communications facilities are not involved in serving the customer.
(4) "Remote Access Data Processing Service" is an offering of data processing
wherein communications facilities, linking a central computer to remote customer
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common carriers use their own computers is "line-switching," which
is a connection between two points on request. 29 The classification
of these services as regulated communications or non-regulated data
processing is a difficult task, and is principally a determination
made on the facts of a given service. 30 All of the transmission is
done over common carrier lines, 31 either wire or cable, except that
which is expanding into microwave service. 32
As communications thus became an integral part of data pro-
cessing and vice versa, it became clear that the communication
carriers themselves could use their expertise, systems and excess
computer capacity to provide data processing software to others. 33
The provision of computer services by common carriers would pre-
sent both a further integration of the communications and data
processing industries and a possible threat to the continued viability
of the software service industry. 34 On the other hand the services of
the software companies might also be seen as infringing on the
traditional realms of the common carriers. 35
terminals, provide a vehicle for the transmission of data between such computer and
customer terminals.
(5) "Hybrid Service" is an offering of service which combines remote access data
processing and message-switching to form a single integrated service.
(i) "Hybrid Data Processing Service" is a hybrid service offering wherein
the message-switching capability is incidental to the data processing function or
purpose.
(ii) "Hybrid Communication Service" is a hybrid service offering wherein
the data processing capability is incidental to the message-switching function or
purpose.
29
 See C. Barnett, supra note 27, at 44 n.17.
'° For example: company A asks its remote computer if an item is in stock and the
computer answers (data processing); company A tells the computer to order stock from
inventory at a certain level (message-switching); company A tells a computer to order from
inventory, correct the inventory balance and bill the buyer (hybrid service); company A's
teletypewriter order to the warehouse is passed through the computer (line-switching).
Message-switching, line-switching and hybrid services all involve use of communications
carrier facilities.
" The services available from the common carriers include cable and wire leasing with a
variety of capacities depending on the needs of the user. The required capacities are largely a
function of the quantity of data to be transmitted and the input/output devices. For example,
a relatively small quantity of data can be transmitted slowly over narrow band circuits, such
as voice telephone line, while a visual display system requires the leasing of special broad
band lines.
32
 The FCC first approved a new carrier service by a private carrier using microwave
transmissions in In re Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).
" The Bell System companies, including American Telephone & Telegraph Co., are
already precluded from entering the data processing field by a consent judgment entered in
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 71,134 (D.N.J. 1956), which, with
exceptions, prohibits them from engaging in businesses other than regulated common carrier
activities.
14
 See Irwin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 Yale L.J. 1299,
1308 (1967).
" As techniques become more refined, the tendency could be for the software companies
to expand the scope of their switching operations and services, perhaps to the point where
they could be classified as communications carriers.
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It was in this factual context that the FCC conducted its in-
quiry and promulgated the rules challenged in GTE Service Corp.
II. THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION
Both the Commission in its Final Decision and the Second
Circuit in its opinion37 based the FCC's authority to promulgate
rules and regulations on the Commission's statutory duty "to make
available . .. a rapid, efficient .. . wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." 38 The basic
authority of the FCC is thus drawn in broad, rather than in specific,
terms. In drawing up the rules which were the subject of dispute in
GTE Service Corp., the FCC tried to distinguish between on the one
hand "attempting to assert jurisdiction over common carriers as
purveyors of computer services, as such,"" which it is not empow-
ered to do, and on the other hand regulating carriers under the belief
that without proper regulatory safeguards, the provision of data
processing services could interfere with the carriers' statutory
obligation. 4 ° The Commission found that the involvement of com-
munications common carriers in data processing activities might
well lead to the impairment of efficient communications services to
the public. This possibility, it said, stems "from the potential of
common carriers to subsidize their data processing operations with
revenues and resources available from their regulated services""
and consequently to charge unreasonable rates for common carrier
service. It was on this basis that the court in GTE Service Corp.
found that the FCC did in fact have authority to promulgate Rules
(b), (c)(1), (2), (3) and (d). 42
In so deciding, the Second Circuit noted that the courts "have
uniformly and consistently interpreted the [Federal Communi-
cations] Act to give the Commission broad and comprehensive
rule-making authority in the new and dynamic field of electronic
communication."43 The court pointed out that on prior occasions the
extension of FCC authority without a specific statutory mandate had
been upheld by the courts. Specifically, in National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 44 the Supreme Court upheld FCC regulations
concerning the control of station licensees by the national broadcast-
26 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 268 (1971).
37 474 F.2d at 730.
24 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
39 28 F.C.C.2d at 268.
41' Id. at 269.
41 28 F.C.C.2d at 299.
42 The court so found despite the objection of Western Union that public advantages
rather than disadvantages would flow from savings to the common carriers passed on to the
public attributable to the sale of excess capacity, and the more general objection that some
cross-subsidization is possible in whatever non-regulated business the carriers are engaged in.
See 28 F.C.C.2d at 271.
43 474 F.2d at 730-31.
44 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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ing networks, promulgated on the basis that they were in the public
interest, despite a lack of specific authority in the Communications
Act. A similar situation was presented in United States v. South-
western Cable Co. 45 In that case the FCC had banned importation
of CATV signals into the 100 largest market areas of the nation, 46
and a challenge was made to the FCC's authority to regulate CATV.
The Supreme Court found that the authority did exist, 47 despite the
fact that it was not specifically set out in the Communications Act.
It did so because of "the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of
the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement
that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust
itself to these factors." 48 Similarly, in Mount Mansfield Television,
Inc. v. FCC, 49 the Second Circuit upheld the authority of the
Commission to regulate prime time access in television communica-
tion despite the absence of any explicit authority in the Act. In
commenting on the decisions of the courts in these cases, the court in
GTE Service Corp. expressed its view that:
[t]he plain implication of these precedents is that . . . the
expansive power of the Commission in the electronic com-
munications field includes the jurisdictional authority to
regulate carrier activities in an area as intimately related to
the communications industry as that of computer services
50
Several observations can be made concerning this part of the
court's holding. First, it is by no means the "plain implication" of
the precedents that the FCC has authority to regulate the activities
of communications common carriers in the data processing field. In
no other case has a court upheld FCC regulation of a field of activity
otherwise not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, but in
which a regulated carrier has become involved, solely on the basis of
an "intimate relationship" between that field and the regulated car-
rier. That much of the holding appears to be without basis, at least
in the cited precedents.
Second, the cases of CATV and data processing are distin-
guishable on factual grounds. CATV operations are a combination
of broadcasting and common carriage, "with certain of the charac-
teristics both of broadcasting and of common carriers, but with all
of the characteristics of neither."." In the CATV case, therefore, the
FCC was dealing with a new type of entry into the broadcasting-
communications field and not, as in the GTE Service Corp. case,
4 ' 392 U.S. 157 (1968),
46
	 C.F.R. § 74.1107 (Supp. 1968). The rule allowed such service as existed on Feb.
15, 1966, and such other service as would be in the public interest.
47 392 U.S. at 172-73.
41 Id., citing FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)..
49 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
5°
 474 F.2d at 731.
11
 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968).
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with the entry of regulated companies into a non-regulated field.
Third, the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction over CATV was not
as certain as one might think and in fact represented a reversal of a
prior narrower FCC view that CATV was not subject to regulation
because it involved neither broadcasting in the sense of radiation,
nor common carriage since the lines were not for public hire. 52 The
Commission stated: "[W]e do not believe we have 'plenary power' to
regulate any and all enterprises which happen to be connected with
one of the many aspects of communications."53 Although this posi-
tion was ultimately reversed by the Commission as respects
CATV, 54 it does not appear that the Commission has always con-
strued its authority to be of the breadth displayed in the data
processing rulings.
Fourth, the rationale of the Southwestern Cable Co. decision is
that the FCC may control a service in direct competition with
regulated broadcasting facilities where the competition might "ulti-
mately deprive the public of the various benefits of a system of local
broadcasting stations."55 The use of a similar rationale in a data
processing context might lead the FCC to assert jurisdiction over
software companies who sell either message-switching, hybrid
service or other products -determined to be primarily
communications, 56 and who would in effect be acting as, and com-
peting with, common carriers. Such a possibility, it should be noted,
is distinct from the regulation of entry of common carriers into the
data processing field. The latter rather than the former has consis-
tently been the position of the Commission in the instant case.
Finally, the rationale itself may be ultimately questionable, for
if competition with regulated broadcasting alone brings CATV
under regulation, then a similar reasoning might call for regulation
of other facilities which do not engage in broadcasting or communi-
cations, but which compete economically with television. Such
facilities include symphonies, theaters and motion pictures.
The basis of the FCC's jurisdiction, then, is an important factor
in determining the scope of that jurisdiction. Fear that the carriers'
involvement in the sale of data processing services would result in
derogation of the Commission's statutory duty to make efficient and
economic communications services available to the public gives the
FCC the authority to regulate the entry of the carriers themselves
into the data processing field. On the other hand, jurisdiction based
12 Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satel-
lite" Stations, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting,
26 F.C.C. 403, 428-29 (1959).
" Id. at 429.
54 In re Amendment of Parts 21, 74 (Proposed Subpart J), and 91 to Adopt Rules and
Regulations Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast Signals by Community
Antenna Television Systems, and Related Matters, 1 F.C,C,2d 453, 464-65 (1965).
55 392 U.S. at 175,
5(' 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.702(e), (f) (Supp. 1972) contains rules providing for FCC determina-
tion of whether a given "hybrid" service is primarily data processing or communications.
171
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
on an analogy to Southwestern Cable Co. might lead to the exercise
of authority over data processing as such. The analogy between
Southwestern Cable Co. and GTE Service Corp. fails, however,
since data processing is distinct from both communications and
broadcasting. The analogy, therefore, provides little basis for the
jurisdiction which the FCC sought to exert.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSE
Assuming that on the facts at hand the FCC did have jurisdic-
tion to promulgate Rules (b), (c)(1), (2), (3), and (d), the question
remains as to whether the creation of these regulations constituted
the best way for the Commission to proceed. 57 Perhaps the most
fundamental question is whether the scope of the administrative
regulations ought to cover the type of situation presented in GTE
Service Corp. The Commission's extension of regulation may in fact
say more about the general tendencies of regulatory agencies than
about the particular problem at hand.
It has been said that "[m]ost regulation came first to answer a
need for protection of some sort."58 When the first regulatory
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), was estab-
lished in 1889, it came largely in response to abuses of railroad
monopolies over the national crop transportation system. 59 Simi-
larly, it was the abuse of radio frequencies that led to the creation of
the Radio Commission in 1927. 60 In the ICC example, however, it
should be noted that when the original evil, the railroads' monopoly
over transportation, ceased to exist due to the increasing use of
automobiles, trucks, buses and airplanes, the ICC's response was
more rather than less regulation. 6 ' At some elusive point in the
administrative process, the expansion of authority ceases to be for
the purpose of protecting the public and takes on the somewhat
different role of " 'straightening out and stabilizing the industry,
making it thereby a more efficient and responsible public
servant. "62
Several factors indicate that a similar type of administrative
self-extension may have taken place in the FCC's inquiry into the
57 "[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency."
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
59
 R. Lorch, Democratic Process and Administrative Law 41 (1969).
59 See Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1113-14 (1954).
617 The fact situation requiring regulation is outlined in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
61 See Jaffe, supra note 59, at 1114. The rationale for regulations promulgated by the
ICC had shifted from consumer protection to arguments for stability of the entire transporta-
tion industry and for a coordinated national transportation policy.
62 Id., quoting ICC Commissioner Eastman's statement in Regulation of Transportation
Agencies, S. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1934).
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involvement of communication common carriers in data processing
activities. First, although it commissioned, and subsequently re-
ceived, a comprehensive report on this subject from the Stanford
Research Institute (SRI), the Commission chose not to follow the
Institute's recommendations. The SRI had concluded that although
there was some possibility of cross-subsidization by carriers in the
data processing field, monopolistic predatory price cutting of data
processing prices with subsequent higher carrier charges would only
be a major problem if carried out by the Bell companies," which
are prohibited from entering the field anyway." The SRI recom-
mendation was "that, for the immediate future, we should adopt a
wait-and-see policy," 65 and this the Commission was unwilling to
do.
Second, there were three dissenters on the Commission who
opposed the creation of Rules (c)(4) and (5), which the court of
appeals subsequently found invalid. In his dissent, FCC Chairman
Burch stated that "the Commission is here guilty of a classical case
of regulatory over-kill."66 He points out that under the "maximum
separation" doctrine, "[c]ompetitive bidding from all supply sources
including affiliates would be barred" 67 to carriers seeking data pro-
cessing services for their own use. This would tend to increase the
cost of data processing to carriers, and this increase in cost would in
turn be passed on to the public. In this regard it should be noted
that other regulated industries such as utilities and transportation
carriers are under no similar disabilities in their purchase and sale of
data processing services. Chairman Burch was of the opinion that
the possibility of future abuse is not such as to require the extent of
regulation proposed in the rules. As commentary on the institutional
aspects of the regulation, Chairman Burch stated:
the Commission has acted in the usual, orthodox, knee-
jerk regulatory fashion: arbitrarily without any real show-
ing of actual or even potential abuse, we have denied a
common carrier access to computer services from its data
affiliate. 68
Third, a survey of prior FCC reactions to technological
developments69 indicates that regulatory overreaction has more
63 The Commission's fear was that costs of the data processing entity, such as overhead
or interest, might be charged to the common carrier, with resulting higher prices for carrier
services to pay for these data processing costs. The SRI position is discussed in the Tentative
Decision, 2S F.C.C.2d 291, 301 (1970).
64 See note 33 supra.
65 See 28 F.C.C.2d at 301.
66 28 F.C.C.2d at 290 (Chairman Burch dissenting).
67 Id. at 290 (dissenting opinion), See text at note 12 supra for a brief explanation of the
maximum separation doctrine.
6R Id. (dissenting opinion).
69 See LeDuc, The FCC v. CATV et al.: A Theory of Regulatory Reflex Action, 23 Fed.
Com. B.J. 93 (1969).
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often than not been the case in the communications field. One
commentator, for example, has expressed the opinion that FCC
impediments delayed commercial television by as much as twelve
years. 7 ° He also points out that the entry of FM broadcasting into
the field was met by FCC assignment of a frequency band which
made AM radio receivers unable to receive FM broadcasts.' 1
Further, the innovation of CATV was met by denying access to the
lucrative markets. It is submitted that the FCC's tendency consis-
tently has been to protect the status quo against all change. It is as if
the Commission has always felt that technological changes to the
detriment of existing interests are necessarily to the detriment of the
public interest as well. In the data processing decision, however, the
Commission has gone one step further. Whereas in prior cases the
Commission has sought to protect its regulated industries from out-
side challenges, in the present case it is trying to protect regulated
common carriers from their own expansion. Further, speculation as
to second hand effects upon the public seems a somewhat tenuous
basis for the Commission's rules. An additional reason for the FCC's
position may well be that "a threat to existing technology poses the
same threat of obsolescence to a bureau expert as it does to the
industry. "72
Fourth, although the Commission expressed its belief that it
would have the authority to create Rules (b), (c) and (d), on a
showing that involvement of communication common carriers in the
data processing field would impair their common carrier respon-
sibilities, it actually promulgated these rules on a lesser showing:
namely, that such involvement might adversely affect the carriers'
statutory obligations. In its April 1970 Tentative Decision, the
Commission stated that:
there is no specific provision which bars a common carrier
from providing non-regulated services . . . . It does not
follow, however, that the Commission may not exercise its
jurisdiction over carriers to prescribe appropriate condi-
tions for engaging in non-regulated services or to prohibit
the furnishing of such services where such activities burden
or impair their common carrier communications obli-
gations."
It further concluded "that we have ample jurisdiction to bar carriers
from providing data processing services upon a proper finding that it
would prevent them from discharging their common carrier respon-
sibilities .. . "74
 In its Final Decision, however, the Commission
7° Id. at 93. Although the system's technology was available in the 1930's, the Commis-
sion declined to grant frequency access for commercial television until 1948.
71 Id. at 93-94.
72 Id. at 103.
71 28 F.C.C.2d at 299-300 (emphasis added].
74 Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
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merely concluded: "It is our view that . . . the provision of data
processing services . . could adversely affect the statutory obliga-
tion of such carriers . . . ."75
 The premise of the Commission was
that jurisdiction exists where certain results would flow from certain
actions. The finding, however, is only that certain results could flow
from those actions. The distinction is more than semantic. Certainly
the Commission would not assert jurisdiction over all activities of
carriers which could affect their statutory duty, for that would
clearly include all activities of the carriers. Further, the regulation is
imposed upon no specific finding, or even the belief, that adverse
effects would result from the involvement of carriers in data proces-
sing activities. The court in GTE Service Corp., upon examining the
Commission's Tentative and Final Decisions, interpreted them as
indicating that the FCC saw the carriers' data processing activities
as posing a "threat" to their statutory duties. 76 Although a "threat"
analysis does not appear in the FCC Decisions, one must wonder,
even if it did appear, whether a "threat" would meet the FCC's
own standards for the imposition of regulations—
namely, the impairment of the carriers' obligations. As previously
noted, the court held that the FCC has jurisdiction to promulgate
rules and regulations where the activities of the carriers "may sub-
stantially affect" their statutory duties." On the one hand this adds
a requirement of substantiality which Chairman Burch might have
argued had not been shown. On the other hand it apparently allows
regulation not only on a showing of actual abuse, but also on a mere
showing of potential abuse. The Commission itself did not claim this
power in its Tentative Decision.
Thus the nature of the administrative agency response is of
interest both in itself and in its relation to the decision in GTE
Service Corp. In the choice between regulating and not regulating,
where perhaps the better course would have been not to act at all,
the FCC chose to regulate despite the recommendation, of the SRI
report. The choice to regulate closely followed similar FCC reactions
to prior technological developments. Also, the decision to regulate
depends on a showing of facts meeting the standards which the
Commission adopts, and it appears that in the present case the
administrative rules were promulgated on a significantly lesser
showing. It is submitted that the Commission should have paid
more attention to these fundamental questions of policy in order to
avoid overreaching its authority. It should be noted, however, that
many of these considerations attach to the wisdom of applying the
regulations rather than to the legality of the application. In the
absence of a showing that the common carriers' involvement in data
processing activities would adversely affect their obligation to pro-
vide efficient and economic communications service to the public, or
75 28 F.C.C.2d at 269 (emphasis added).
76 474  F.2d at 730.
77
 Id, at 731.
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of a showing that if there were such an adverse effect it would be
substantial in nature, Chairman Burch's opinion that the rules were
unwise seems the more reasonable position.
IV. FCC CONTROL OVER DATA PROCESSING
In the first part of its decision the court found that the FCC had
authority to regulate the entry of common carriers into the field of
data processing through an approach of "maximum separation" 78 of
services. It held that the Commission's rules requiring formation of a
separate affiliate" were "fully within the authority of the Commis-
sion and amply supported by findings."80 These rules, however,
create the likelihood of a sale or lease of hardware by the carrier to
the affiliate with a subsequent sale of data processing services by the
affiliate to the carrier at below market prices. The Commission
found that the existence of such a likelihood "would be conducive to
the development of the very substantive ills that our concept of
maximum separation is designed to inhibit." 8 I For this reason it
promulgated Rules (c)(4) and (5), prohibiting the carrier from allow-
ing the affiliate to use its name or symbol and prohibiting the carrier
from buying or leasing data processing services from the affiliate.
The concept of forming an affiliate is not in itself repugnant to the
carriers. Indeed, the FCC found that some carriers, for reasons
independent of regulation, had voluntarily established separate cor-
porations to sell data processing services, 82 and the present action
itself being brought by already established data processing affiliates
indicates that compliance with these rules was not a major issue for
the carriers. The real teeth in the regulations were thus provided by
Rules (c)(4) and (5), and it was the promulgation of these rules which
the court found "to be without authority either in the Communica-
tions Act or in the cases construing it." 83
The Commission's argument in favor of these rules was based
on two separate theories. The first was that without Rules (c)(4) and
(5) the telephone companies could still use their monopolist leverage
to extend their power into the data processing industry." The
second was the possibility of cross-subsidization permitted by the
rules absent the provisions of Rules (c)(4) and (5). 85 As to the first
28 Id. at 732.
47 C.F.R.	 64.702(b), (c)(1}, (2), (3), (d). See note 11 supra for full text of rules.
8' 474 F.2d at 732.
Pi 28 F.C.C.2d at 273.
82
 Id. at 272.
83 474 F.2d at 733.
" 28 F.C.C.2d at 273.
is Id. The theory of cross-subsidization with respect to sales by the affiliate to the carrier
is that even if the two are separate entities, dealings between the two might result in higher
prices to users of communications services. For example, the carrier might pay the affiliate
higher than market prices for services in order to help the affiliate get started in business or
obtain or retain a certain share of the market. Or, in the alternative the carrier might accept
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ground the court held that the FCC's "concern over data processing
services is ultra vires." 86 On the second ground the court found that
the Commission's concerns "do not sustain the Commission's intru-
sion into the data processing activities of the separate affiliate." 87
A. The AntitrUst Theory
The basis of the court's rejection of the Commission's antitrust
argument was that Rules (c)(4) and (5) actually impose regulation on
the affiliates and not merely on the common carriers. 88 As the court
pointed out, Rules (b) and (c)(1), (2) and (3) have established the
affiliate in such a manner as to be outside the regulatory jurisdiction
of the FCC. The affiliate is defined in the rules as a data processing
service and as such is neither a brOadcaster nor a common carrier
within the purview of FCC regulation. 89 Although the Commission
based its authority to create Rules (C)(4) and (5) on the fact that the
affiliate is a creature of the carrier, the court rejected this reasoning
and stated that:
the Commission itself has not only appointed and anointed
the separate data processing affiliate but cut the umbilical
cord to the parent by the "maximum separation" provisions
we have previously discussed. The Commission has no
basis at all to now pronounce that the carrier's progeny is
really illegitimate . „ . 90
Having decided that Rules (c)( .4) and (5) actually regulate the
affiliate and that the affiliate, by the terms of Rules (b), (c)(1), (2), (3)
and (d), is really a data processing entity rather than a communica-
tions entity, the court nevertheless had to decide whether the FCC
could on other grounds assert jurisdiction over the affiliate. In this
regard it should be noted that the FCC stated in its Final Decision
that it had not undertaken any regulation of the data processing
industry. 91 Such a statement, of course, would not be binding if the
rules themselves were otherwise valid.
In addressing itself to the FCC's antitrust argument the court
recognized the general proposition that the Commission may prop-
erly make regulations which are based upon antitrust
considerations. 92 Some question exists, however, as to whether this
authority covers both horizobtal and vertical integration involving
less service for a fixed expenditure. In either case an inefficient use of carrier resources is
made, in effect, to subsidize the affiliate, although the affiliate is a separate entity, and the
costs are ultimately borne by the consumers of communications services.
86 474 F.2d at 734.
87 Id. at 735.
88 See note 24 supra.
89 See 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c), set forth in note 11 supra.
96 474 F.2d at 733.
91 See note 22 supra.
92 474 F.2d at 733.	 1
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communications carriers. 93 FCC control over horizontal monopolies
is clearly established by the requirement of the Communications Act
that telephone and telegraph companies obtain prior FCC, approval
for all proposed mergers and other consolidations." In asserting
jurisdiction over vertical integration of the carriers, i.e., the provi-
sion of services by the affiliates to the carriers, the Commission
relied95 on three sections of the Communications Act which provide
that various charges and rates of the carriers must be just and
reasonable. 96 The court correctly pointed out that the language of
the statute specifically limits the jurisdiction of the Commission to
consideration of the pric es and rates charged by the carriers
themselves. 97
 The statute does not purport to authorize the FCC to
regulate activities or entities other than communications common
carriers. As the court noted: "[T]he unfair competition, restraint of
trade or potential threat of monopoly, must be in a market in which
the Commission has jurisdiction."98
A second potential source of statutory authority for the
Commission's control over vertical integration is the Clayton Act, 99
which provides for regulation of various types of monopolies. That
Act vests authority in the FCC to enforce compliance with its terms
"where applicable to common carriers engaged in wire or radio
communication. " 100 The FCC's authority, as enunciated in the Act,
is limited to situations in which the Commission has "reason to
believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the
provisions of sections 13, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act]."'°' Such a
limitation, it may be argued, excludes Commission action on pro-
spective violations such as those the Commission thought might
result from the integration of common carrier and data processing
services. Further, the remedy provided by the Clayton Act is the
issuance of a cease and desist order by the Commission and not the
promulgation of rules. 102 As to prospective violations by merger the
Clayton Act states that:
93 See note 25 supra for an explanation of horizontal and vertical integration.
" 47 U.S.C. §§ 221, 222 (1970).
95 474 F.2d at 739 n.15.
" 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970) provides: "All charges . . . in connection with such
communication service, shall be just and reasonable . . . ."
47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make
any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges ... in connection with like communica-
tion service .. ."
47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970) provides: "Whenever . .. the Commission shall be of the
opinion that any charge . . . of any carrier or carriers is or will be in violation of any of the
provisions of this chapter, the Commission is authorized and empowered to determine and
prescribe what will be the just and reasonable charge . . . ."
97 474 F.2d at 734 n.15.
98
 Id. at 734.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-27, 44 (1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1970).
'°° 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970), which vests authority in the FCC to enforce specifically the
provisions of §§ 13, 14, 18 and 19.
L01 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
102
 Id.
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no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of one or more corporations . . . where . . . the
effect of such acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 103
From this section it would appear that jurisdiction over mergers
generally—so long as they are not mergers of communications
carriers—is in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rather than in
the FCC."4
In attempting to set up a basis for assuming jurisdiction in
antitrust matters, the Commission cited several cases which dealt
with the formation of horizontal monopolies within the communica-
tions field. In one of these cases, Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 105
the District of Columbia Circuit, in denying the application of a
town's only newspaper for a license to acquire a radio station, did so
on the ground that the resulting concentration of control over the
media would not be in the public interest within the meaning of the
licensing statute.'" Significantly, it was the fact that the granting of
the license would not be in the public interest which provided the
statutory basis for denying the plaintiff's application. The antitrust
aspect standing on its own might have been insufficient to accom-
plish this result.
Also cited by the Commission was General Telephone Co. v.
United States.'" In that case the court sustained certain rules
promulgated by the FCC which prohibited telephone carriers from
furnishing CATV service to the public either directly or through
affiliates. The court in GTE Service Corp., however, distinguished
this case on two grounds. First, said the court, United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co. had clearly established the jurisdiction of
the FCC over CATV. General Telephone, then, involved the rela-
tionship between two FCC-regulated entities, while in GTE Service
Corp. the rules controlled the relationship between one regulated
and one non-regulated entity.'" Second, said the court, there is a
distinction between the data processing field, which is marked by
low capital requirements and relatively free entry,"9
 and the CATV
industry, the gateway to which is controlled by the carriers' control
over communications lines.'" The distinctions raised
 by the court in
107 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
' 04 The FTC's enabling.statute, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970), states: The Commission is
empowered and directed to prevent persons ... from using unfair methods of competition in
commerce... ."
1 " 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
ID6 The licensing statute in question is 47, U.S.0 § .107 (1970).
' iv 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
"4 474 F.2d at 735.
t119 Id .
1 " Use of telephone companies' poles, conduits and rights of way is a necessity for
CATV. Since the telephone carriers have a monopoly on these facilities, their potential for
control of CATV is apparent if they are allowed to enter the field.
179
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
GTE Service Corp. are not quite as clear as they might originally
appear to be. If CATV is considered a communications common
carrier, then the regulation is a control over horizontal monopolies
of carriers. To the extent that CATV is seen as a broadcaster,"'
however, the Commission's rule regulates the control of a broad-
caster by a carrier, and this is more akin to a vertical integration
than to a horizontal integration. The Court in General Telephone, in
upholding the Commission's rules as being within the standards set
down in 47 U.S.C. § 214(a), 1 ' 2 found that CATV operators were
common carriers. 113
 The issue in that case, then, was not framed, as
it was in GTE Service Corp., as whether an affiliate of a carrier
could be regulated, but rather, as whether one communication car-
rier could, in the public interest, control another communication
carrier. Therefore, if the General Telephone case is read as approv-
ing the regulation of one carrier's control over another carrier—that
is, if CATV is seen as a carrier—then the case is not analogous to
GTE Services Corp. in which the FCC established regulation over a
non-carrier entity. If, however, General Telephone stands for ap-
proval of FCC regulation of a non-carrier entity based on the
Commission's statutory duty to provide communications
service—that is, if CATV is seen as a broadcaster—then there is a
better analogy to GTE Service Corp., for the FCC would then be
resting its jurisdiction over CATV on its obligation to provide com-
mon carrier service rather than on its obligation to regulate broad-
casting. In the GTE Service Corp. case, the FCC purported not to
regulate data processors as data processors but only in their relation
to communications carriers. Under this analysis the General Tele-
phone case can be viewed as a better precedent than the Court in
GTE Service Corp. felt it to be.
Other cases indicate that the antitrust jurisdiction of the FCC,
other than that which it is specifically authorized to exercise in cases
of merger of common carriers,' ' 4 is severely limited. In FCC v. RCA
Communications, Inc., 115 for example, the Supreme Court held that
certain FCC rulings" 6 purportedly based on national or congres-
sional policies favoring free competition were invalid in that they
were not based on the "public interest" standard set out in the
Communications Act. Under the Court's holding the FCC may not
" ' Sec text at note Si supra.
uz 449 F.2d at 858. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970) provides:
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of an extension of any
line ... until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate
that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the
construction . .. of such additional or extended tine.. .
1 " 449 F.2d at 859.
114
 47 U.S.C. §§ 221, 222 (1970).
15
 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
116
 The FCC ruled that MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. could open new radio telegraph
lines to Europe, to which RCA, a holder of existing lines, objected on the grounds that the
Commission's justification' for its ruling was insufficient. Id.
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base its regulations solely on antitrust policies. The Court did note,
however, that "competition is a relevant factor in weighing the
public interest."" 7 It is also notable that part of the Court's reason-
ing is that the FCC may not assume that competition is in fact a
good thing as a matter of policy, for the degree of regulation of
many industries indicates that the fields in which competition is or is
not good is something to be determined by Congress. 118 One impli-
cation which this case has in the data processing field is that not
only is the FCC precluded from determining the methods by which
free competition is to be maintained in the data processing field, but
also that the FCC is essentially incompetent to determine whether or
not free competition in this field ought to be maintained in the first
place.
A second aspect of FCC antitrust cases involves the question of
which agency has primary jurisdiction over antitrust matters. In this
area also the FCC has not played an expansive antitrust role. In the
leading case of United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 19 the
Justice Department brought a Sherman Act civil action against RCA
and NBC for conspiracy in restraint of trade arising out of the
transfer of ownership of two television stations. RCA raised as an
affirmative defense the prior FCC approval of the broadcasting
license transfer in question. RCA asserted "that the regulatory
scheme of the Communications Act has so displaced that of the
Sherman Act that the FCC had primary jurisdiction to license the
exchange transaction,"' 2° and that "the only method available to the
Government for redressing its antitrust grievances was to intervene
in the FCC proceedings." 12 ' In addressing itself to the issues before
it, the RCA Court had occasion to examine the legislative history of
the Radio Act of 192 7 122 in an attempt to determine the congres-
sional intent in respect to certain relevant provisions of that Act.
The Court found that the intent of Congress was that absent a prior
judicial finding of antitrust violations the Commission could not
deny or revoke a broadcasting license.' 23 A determination by the
Commission that an antitrust violation had taken place was
insufficient, said the Court, to call the Commission's regulatory
powers into existence. 124 In this regard the Court concluded that "it
is equally clear that courts retained jurisdiction to pass on alleged
117 Id. at 94.
111‘ Id. at 91-93.
119 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
120 Id. at 338.
" 1 Id.
122 Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
I" 358 U.S. at 342.
124 Id. For unsuccessful attempts to enact amendments specifically allowing the Commis-
sion to deny or revoke changes upon a finding of antitrust violation, see 67 Cong. Rec.
5484-85, 5501-04, 5555 (1926). Presently 47 U.S.C. 313 (1970) allows the FCC to deny or
revoke a license upon a prior judicial finding of an antitrust violation, but not upon an
administrative finding of such a violation.
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antitrust violations irrespective of Commission action," 125 and that
"the legislative history of the Act reveals that the Commission was
not given the power to decide antitrust issues as such." 126
One important aspect of the Court's decision in the RCA case
was its reply to RCA's contention that primary jurisdiction should
rest in the FCC because of its technical expertise in the broadcasting
field.' 27
 On that point the Court raised a distinction between com-
munications common carriers under Title II of the Communications
Act, whose rates and entry into the field were regulated, and broad-
casters under Title III of the Act, who operate under free entry and
competitive pricing. The Court cited FCC v. Sanders Brothers
Radio Station,' 28
 in which the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he Act
recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of free competition.
The sections dealing with broadcasting demonstrate that Congress
has not, in its regulatory scheme, abandoned the principle of free
competition . . . ." 129
 Thus, the conclusion of the Court in the RCA
case was that where there was no direct regulation of prices there
was no justification for primary antitrust jurisdiction in the FCC. 130
That is, there is no element of technical expertise in the FCC which
would make jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission or of the
Justice Department inappropriate. This line of reasoning has impor-
tant implications for FCC regulation of data processing affiliates of
common carriers. As the court pointed out in GTE Service Corp.,
the FCC itself has found that the data processing industry is charac-
terized by relatively free entry into the field and by open competition
not requiring regulation."' Moreover, so long as the FCC does not
attempt to regulate the computer service field, it cannot be said to
have the technical expertise which would justify its exercise of
primary antitrust jurisdiction vis-a-vis that industry.
It is also notable that while the Commission was willing to
promulgate rules that would have a regulatory effect on the data
processing industry, it has not been willing to exercise similar con-
trol over other non-regulated fields where the need for such action
has appeared just as great. An example of this unwillingness is the
Commission's failure to exercise any regulatory jurisdiction over
Western Electric, a corporation controlled by American Telephone
and Telegraph. The relationship of these two entities is a prime
example of vertical integration of user and supplier to the extent that
90 percent of communications equipment is supplied by manufactur-
125 358 U.S. at 343-44.
126 Id. at 346.
111 Id.
128 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
129 Id. at 470.
130 358 U.S. at 350.
131 474 F.2d at 735.
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ing affiliates of common carriers, 132 and the bulk of that amount is
done by Western Electric. The FCC, however, extends no regula-
tory control over Western Electric other than its practice of consider-
ing the reasonableness of the prices charged by the subsidiary to the
Bell Telephone companies for purposes of establishing Bell System
tariffs.'" However, the prices charged by the subsidiary to Bell may
be only the tip of the iceberg as far as their interdependent relation-
ship is concerned. The difficulties of tracing improper cost shifting
between Bell Telephone and Western Electric remove most of the
value in even this limited power of the FCC.
Thus, the Western Electric situation clearly presents a
monopolistic vertical integration which is wholly within the scope of
the Clayton Act jurisdiction of the FCC. However, it has not been
the FCC that has sought regulation of component manufacturers on
antitrust grounds. Rather, it has been the Department of Justice that
has done so. 134 Further, where there is no special reason for FCC
regulation under the criteria set out in RCA so as to require that the
Commission have primary jurisdiction over the field, the question is
properly, under 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), one for the FTC.
Other cases which have dealt with the entry of entities other
than computer service corporations into the data processing field do
not support the Commission's regulation of the data processing
industry. In United States v. IBM, 135 a New York federal district
court issued a consent decree which required IBM to establish the
separate Service Bureau Corporation as an affiliate to sell computer
software. This case involved the regulation of activities wholly
within the data processing industry to prevent the virtual monopoly
which IBM already had in the field of computer hardware from
expanding into a monopoly over computer software as well.
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, inc.
v. Camp, 136 the issue before the Supreme Court was the sale of data
processing services by banks. The basis of the suit was a ruling by
the defendant, the Comptroller of the Currency, that banking insti-
tutions could provide computer processing services to other banks
and to bank customers.' 37 The case reached the Supreme Court not
on the merits but on the narrower issue of the standing of ADAPSO
to sue on the basis of the alleged invalidity of the rules promulgated
by the Comptroller. The merits of the case were not reached in the
132 Irwin & McKee, Vertical Integration and the Communications Equipment Industry:
Alternatives for Public Policy, 22 Fed. Corn. B.J. 131 (1968).
133 Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 152-53 (1930).
114 See, e. g United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (1).N.J., filed Feb. 14,
1949); United States v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civil No. 64-1912 (S.D.N.Y., filed
June 19, 1964). Both of these cases were settled before a judicial decision was rendered.
135 1956 Trade Cas, 71,117, 71,125 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) {consent decree).
136 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
137 Comptroller's Manual for National Banks 9 3500 {Oct. 15, 1966).
183
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
decision, but the holding of the Court that ADAPSO had standing to
sue as a party with adverse economic interests' 38 presents an alter-
native to FCC intervention.
To the extent that Rules (c)(4) and (5) are justified by the FCC
as an attempt to preserve competition in the data processing field,
the court held that the FCC may regulate against unfair competition
only in markets over which it has jurisdiction. E 39 Moreover, the
FCC has not traditionally been active in the antitrust field. It
appears that the court has recognized that although antitrust consid-
erations were the primary reason for FCC regulation of the data
processing affiliate, the Commission's real concern was with the
communications carriers, and its antitrust argument was merely
utilized to justify the disallowance of dealings between the affiliates
and the carriers.
B. The Cross-Subsidization Theory
The second theory on which the Commission based the validity
of Rules (c)(4) and (5) was that absent these rules transactions
between a carrier and its affiliate are "conducive to improprieties
which are difficult to detect." 14° In the Commission's opinion the
rules were necessary to accomplish the end sought, namely the
elimination of any possibility that regulated rates would be higher
due to the carrier's subsidization of its affiliate.' 41 On this question
the court simply held that the evil to be prevented does not justify
the means chosen since the means chosen—the promulgation of
Rules (c)(4) and (5)—are beyond the scope of the FCC's authority. 142
In answering the FCC's argument that the court should not concern
itself with the wisdom of the Commission's rules, nor should it
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission,' 43 the court in
GTE Service Corp. pointed out that in the case before it the question
of the scope of judicial review was not presented. The court did not
find that Rules (c)(4) and (5) were lacking in foundation or that they
constituted an abuse of discretion, but only that they were beyond
the FCC's jurisdiction. The court specifically stated:
The basis for our decision here is not that we disagree with
the prudence or wisdom of the Commission but simply that
the Commission had no jurisdiction under its Act or in the
cases construing it, to regulate a separate affiliate's busi-
ness in the data processing market. That is properly the
concern of the Anti-Trust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission . . . 144
' 38 397 U.S. at 156.
19
 474 F.2d at 733.
14° 28 F.C.C.2d at 273.
141 See note 85 supra for a description of the cross-subsidization problem presented in
this area.
"2
 474 F.2d at 735.
143 Id. at 736.
144 Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The distinction drawn by the GTE Services Corp. court be-
tween the permissible and impermissible regulations seems to be
essentially correct. If the FCC were allowed to extend its jurisdic-
tion over the data processing industry in this case, then by analo-
gous extensions the scope of FCC authority would be enlarged
clearly beyond legislative intentions. The significance of GTE Ser-
vice Corp. is that in this case the court held that the FCC's stated
intent to regulate only the common carriers provided insufficient
grounds for rules which imposed de facto regulation on the data
processing industry which itself is not subject to FCC control.
In addition to discussion of the court's view of the legality of the
rules, this note has dealt with certain aspects of the wisdom of the
rules. The SRI report and Chairman Burch's dissent, as well as the
cited history of FCC action regarding prior technological develop-
ments, seem to indicate that the Commission may not have given
adequate consideration to its option not to apply the regulations in
question, particularly Rules (c)(4) and (5). In the factual context of
the communications industry, the possibility of large scale monopoly
over the data processing industry exists only for the Bell system
companies which even without these rules are constrained from
entering the field. 145 Whatever possibility of derogation of the car-
riers' statutory obligations exists is certainly lessened by the disabil-
ity of the Bell companies, and this fact should have been weighed by
the Commission in considering the wisdom of promulgating the
rules. At least, the possibility of cross-subsidization between tele-
phone companies other than Bell companies and the data processing
entities would not appear to be such a significant threat in deroga-
tion of statutory obligations so as to require the degree of regulation
imposed by the Commission. In this - respect the GTE Service Corp.
decision to invalidate at least a portion of the rules is a move in the
right direction.
Constitutional Law—Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Tax
Liability Investigations—Tax Records in Possession of Third
Party—Couch v. United States. 1 —In 1969 the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) commenced an investigation of the business tax re-
turns of petitioner, Mrs. Lillian V. Couch, the sole proprietress of a
restaurant. 2 Pursuant to this investigation IRS agents began exam-
I" See note 33 supra.
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
2 The IRS investigation of petitioner was initiated in order to determine her tax liability
for the years 1964- 1968. Id. at 323. The investigative powers of the IRS are appraised in
Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering: An Appraisal of the Investigative Pow-
ers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. Ind. Corn. L. Rev. 657 (1965).
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